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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of a constitutionally protected realm of academic freedom
is controversial and judicially unsettled.1 With their most protective
rhetoric, courts have referred to "the robust tradition of academic free-
dom in our nation's post-secondary schools."2 The Supreme Court has
proclaimed that
© Copyight held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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anapolis. A.B. 1972, University of Virginia; Ph.D. 1976, Indiana University; J.D.
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for the research assistance of Rachel Anne Scherer. The author frankly concedes
the alignment of professional self-interest and the normative recommendations
below, denying only the relevance of any possible monopoly rent-seeking behavior
to the strength or weakness of the argument. For a standard public-choice theory
cite, see, for example, Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies,
and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
1. Some of the potential conflicts between academic freedom as a constitutionally
protected value exercised by individual faculty members and their state-subsi-
dized universities were recently hinted at in the government workplace case of
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). The Garcetti case is discussed infra
Part III, notes 150-83 and accompanying text.
2. Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001) (offensive class-
room language). Note that Hardy involves a classroom teacher at the level of
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
[o]ur Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned.
That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
3
Beyond the strands of supportive rhetoric, however, lies much current
controversy and uncertainty. One court has observed that
"'[a]cademic freedom' is a term that is often used, but little explained,
by federal courts."4 Academic freedom is largely unanalyzed,5 unde-
fined,6 and unguided by principled application,7 leading to its incon-
sistent8 and skeptical or questioned invocation. 9
Thus, the relationship between academic freedom and the First
Amendment is typically left unclear. Could any teachers ever have
special academic freedom claims that are not subsumed under general
First Amendment doctrine?1O If university administrations and
boards of trustees themselves have academic freedom claims of any
sort," do those claims fall equally within the logic of freedom of
state-funded or public institutions like community, technical, or junior colleges.
The rhetoric of academic freedom often declines to distinguish between, say, the
graduate level seminar and the community college, or even between public and
private educational institutions.
3. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted). Note
that this language seems to suggest that academic freedom is at least in some
contexts a matter of the First Amendment directly. Note also the implied sugges-
tion that academic freedom can be exercised by individual instructors, perhaps
along with or against university administrative officials. Those officials may in
turn also hold separate sorts of academic freedom, exercisable against either indi-
vidual instructors or against public officials outside the university who seek to
influence university policy or practice. See infra notes 79-98 and accompanying
text.
4. Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
5. Id. (stating that "courts are remarkably consistent in their unwillingness to give
analytical shape to the rhetoric of academic freedom" (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolu-
tion of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REV. 301, 302 (1998))).
6. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410 ("Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doc-
trine [of academic freedom] floats in the law, picking up decisions as a hull does
barnacles." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting J.
Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99
YALE L.J. 251, 253 (1989))).
7. See id.
8. See id. (citing Stuller, supra note 5, at 303).
9. See Schrier v. Univ. of Colo., 427 F.3d 1253, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2005); Urofsky,
216 F.3d at 410 (citing Byrne, supra note 6, at 262-64).
10. See, e.g., Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 884 n.3 (7th Cir. 2003) (claimant's alleg-
edly separate academic freedom claim as subsumed within a broader First
Amendment claim, where the broader First Amendment scope affords some de-
gree of protection for academic freedom (citing Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch.
Corp., 631 F.2d 1301, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM's LAW
247-50 (1996))).
11. For a discussion, see, for example, David M. Rabban, Functional Analysis of "In-
dividual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53
[Vol. 85:793
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speech?12 Assuming that only public universities are bound to respect
First and Fourteenth Amendment free speech rights, does the logic of
academic freedom nonetheless suggest any guidance for private
universities?13
The existence of the First Amendment itself has not yet brought
clarity regarding the degree, if any,14 to which a college professor's 15
or other public school teacher's16 classroom speech is protected explic-
itly, in academic freedom terms or not, under the First Amendment.
There are ringing declarations to the effect that
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (1990). See also Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 414 (stating
that "the Court has never recognized that professors possess a First Amendment
right of academic freedom to determine for themselves the content of their
courses and scholarship"); id. at 412 (stating that "the Supreme Court has never
set aside a state regulation on the basis that it infringed a First Amendment
right to academic freedom"); id. at 410 (stating that "to the extent that the Con-
stitution recognizes any right of 'academic freedom' above and beyond the First
Amendment rights to which everyone is entitled, the right inheres in the Univer-
sity, not in individual professors").
12. In one instance involving production of a religiously controversial play, Judge
Posner aligned college teachers and university administrators together in a court
claim brought by citizen outsiders. See Linnemeier v. Bd. of Trs. of Purdue Univ.,
260 F.3d 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Classrooms are not public forums; but the
school authorities and the teachers, not the courts, decide whether classroom in-
struction shall include works by blasphemers."). Judge Posner explicitly noted
the distinction and possible conflict between individual teacher academic freedom
and the academic freedom or institutional autonomy of a school and its adminis-
tration in the artwork relocation case of Piarowski v. Illinois Community College
District, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. For an exploration of some of the basic logic of state action, see R. George Wright,
State Action and State Responsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 685 (1990).
14. See supra note 11 (quoting the en banc majority opinion in Urofsky, 216 F.3d at
414, 412, 410). Urofsky involved a state statute restricting state employee access
to sexually explicit materials via state computers without supervisory authoriza-
tion. See also, e.g., Edwards v. Cal. Univ., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) ("[W~e
conclude that a public university professor does not have a First Amendment
right to decide what will be taught in the classroom." (citing Bradley v. Pitts-
burgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that high school,
as distinct from university, teacher not entitled to choose own curriculum or
classroom management style contrary to school policy))). The opinion in Edwards
was written by then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito.
15. See, e.g., Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "[nleither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has determined what
scope of First Amendment protection is to be given a public college professor's
classroom speech" in context of alleged hostile learning environment attributed to
professor's sexually oriented classroom language).
16. See, e.g., Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir.
2001) (observing that "[n]either this court nor the Supreme Court has definitively
resolved whether and to what extent a teacher's instructional speech is protected
by the First Amendment" in the context of classroom reachers requiring parental
enforcement of English-only language rules (citing Cohen, 92 F.3d at 971; Karen
C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30
J.L. & EDUC. 1, 6 (2001))).
2007]
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the First Amendment protects the right of faculty members to engage in aca-
demic debates, pursuits, and inquiries and to discuss "ideas, narratives, con-
cepts, imagery, [and] opinions-scientific, political or aesthetic-[with] an
audience whom the speaker seeks to inform, edify, or entertain."
1 7
At the same time, other lines of authority suggest that such academic
freedom rights under freedom of speech may be limited' 8 if they exist
at all, and may not extend beyond the rights available to any
nonteacher. 19
It is not surprising, given this confusion, that the courts have not
yet settled upon a single judicial test in addressing First Amendment
academic freedoms of teachers at any level of schooling. 20 For the
sake of initial simplicity, we may reduce the major test contenders to
two,21 but each of these two major contending tests has generated its
own significant variations and offshoots. 2 2
17. Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 2003) (alleged sexually charged com-
ments at off-campus professional conference classified as unprotected speech on
matters of private interest and concern (alteration in original) (quoting Swank v.
Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990))). See also Pugel v. Bd. of Trs., 378
F.3d 659, 668-69 (7th Cir. 2004) (similarly quoting Swank in the context of dis-
missal of graduate student for alleged academic misconduct).
18. See, for example, the sources cited supra note 14. See also Johnson-Kurek v.
Abu-Absi, 423 F.3d 590, 593 (6th Cir. 2005) ("To the extent the Constitution rec-
ognizes any right of 'academic freedom' above and beyond the First Amendment
rights to which every citizen is entitled, the right inheres in the University, not in
individual professors." (quoting Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 410)). The question of what
First Amendment rights any citizen would hold if such citizen were placed in the
position of teaching a graduate seminar is close to unhelpful, if not meaningless.
19. See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 411 n.13 (notingthat "the argument raises the specter of
a constitutional right enjoyed by only a limited class of citizens"). Presumably
any account of constitutionally enforceable academic freedom will wish to avoid
any elements of unjustified privileging or elitism. By way of loose analogy, the
Court has in several contexts declared that the rights of journalists, even under
the Free Press Clause, do not extend beyond those of non-journalists. See, e.g.,
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833-34 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
684-85 (1972).
20. For a recent reference to the circuit split on teacher free speech rights, see Lee v.
York County School Division, 418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821-24 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2006).
For other references, also see Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 617 n.29 (5th Cir.
2005), and Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074-77 (11th Cir. 1991).
21. See infra notes 23-24. For purposes of this constitutional analysis, we think of
public university tenure systems, formal and informal, as well as promotion and
post-tenure review processes, as a matter of state statutory or administrative
law, state contract law, and of procedural due process. See Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Such ar-
rangements may be constrained by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
22. For a sense of some of the possibilities, see the circuit split between versions of
the Hazelwood and the Pickering-Connick tests, cited in Chiras, 432 F.3d at 615
n.27, and in Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1072-77 (citing various considerations), and the
teacher-as-agent language in cases discussed infra notes 171-83 and accompany-
ing text.
[Vol. 85:793
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The two most popular general contenders, neither of which seems
reducible to the other, are the Hazelwood test 23 and the Picker-
ing-Connick-Garcetti test.2 4 To dramatically oversimplify, in apply-
ing the Hazelwood test to teacher speech the first question is whether
the teacher's speech could reasonably be perceived to reflect the ap-
proval of the school administration.25 If so, regulation of the teacher's
speech can be justified if the speech restriction is reasonably related to
any legitimate pedagogical concern. 2 6 Whether such a regulation, un-
like regulation of speech in typical nonpublic forum cases, 27 could be
based on the viewpoint or message of the teacher's speech is unclear
and has divided the circuits.28
The main alternative to Hazelwood is the Pickering-Connick-
Garcetti test,29 or for convenience hereafter, the "PCG" test. It would
be an understatement to say that the PCG test involves important
complications and uncertainties. In the interests of simplicity,
though, we can say that the PCG test first asks whether the teacher's
speech addresses a matter of public interest and concern [hereinafter,
occasionally, a MOPIC]. 3 0 It has been suggested that a teacher's
broadly curricular speech cannot rise to the level of speech on a
MOPIC.31 If, on the other hand, the teacher' speech is shown to ad-
dress a MOPIC, the court then undertakes an interest balancing. The
court weighs the teacher-employee's 32 interest in speaking against
the government-employer's 33 interest in the efficiency, discipline, mo-
23. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267-69 (1988). For some
applications of Hazelwood to in-class teacher speech at various levels, see the
cases cited in Cockrel v. Shelby County School District, 270 F.3d 1036, 1055 n.7
(6th Cir. 2001).
24. "Pickering" refers to Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574-75
(1968); "Connick" refers to Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-49 (1983); and
"Garcetti" refers to Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959-62 (2006).
25. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
28. For a recent tabulation of the split on viewpoint-based speech regulations under
Hazelwood, see Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 615 n.27 (5th Cir. 2005). See also
R. George Wright, School-Sponsored Speech and the Surprising Case for View-
point-Based Regulations, 31 S. ILL. L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
29. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
31. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368-69 (4th Cir.
1998) (en banc); Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824-25 (E.D.
Va. 2006).
32. At some point, presumably, the interests of the immediate and perhaps the more
indirect audience in hearing the speech should be factored into the balance. See
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958-59 (2006).
33. We may assume that references to the government employer's interests encom-
pass the interests of the broader public in effective governmental operation.
20071
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rale, and overall appropriate operation of the government
workplace.3 4
For the teacher's speech to be protected under PCG, the speech
thus must, at a minimum, address a matter of public interest and con-
cern, and the teacher's interest in speaking must outweigh the con-
flicting government workplace interests.3 5 In addition, however, the
Supreme Court in Garcetti has recently validated a number of lower
courts in insisting that the speaker also have spoken in the capacity of
a citizen, rather than in the capacity of a task-discharging government
employee. 36
The latter idea seems to be that speaking as a government em-
ployee pursuant to employee responsibilities, as opposed to as a citi-
zen, is a crucially distinct role. 3 7 Speech uttered in one's role as public
employee, perhaps including as a teacher discharging one's obliga-
tions as a teacher,38 is thus not speech uttered as a citizen. Such pub-
lic employee speech is not, in general, eligible under Garcetti for
constitutional protection. 39 This result may rely on a theory that
speech in one's employee capacity must inescapably also be speech
that is merely on a matter of personal interest. Or perhaps the theory
is that speaking merely in one's employee capacity, even on a matter
of great public interest, must, given the conflicting interests, always
be decisive against free speech protection. 40
34. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Cockrel v. Shelby
County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1052-56 (6th Cir. 2001); Urofsky, 216 F.3d at
406.
35. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994).
36. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1957-61; Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-69. But cf. Cockrel,
270 F.3d at 1051-52 (critiquing the view that public school teachers' classroom
speech is speech on matters of personal, and not public, interest because it is
made as an employee).
37. But cf. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961-62 (recognizing that formal job description
may not be decisive in classifying speech as made in one's capacity as citizen or as
employee).
38. The majority in Garcetti sought to set aside the question of any possible revisions
of the basic PCG rule in contexts raising significant concerns for academic free-
dom. See id. at 1962.
39. See id. at 1960 ("We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant
to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communica-
tions from employee discipline."). Again, the majority in Garcetti sought to set
aside government employee speech cases raising academic freedom issues. See
id. at 1962.
40. The cases are not entirely clear on whether speaking pursuant to one's employee
status and responsibilities is itself disqualifying, or whether speech in such ca-
pacity means that the speech cannot, somehow, be on a matter of public interest,
however that idea is defined. For hints, but no consistent and unequivocal the-
ory, see, for example, Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1957-61; Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-69;
and Cockrel, 270 F.3d at 1051-52. A desire to not encourage raising employee
2007] ACADEMIC FREEDOM 799
In any event, the Hazelwood and the PCG tests, with their off-
shoots and complications, form much of the basis upon which constitu-
tional academic freedom cases at various academic levels are typically
resolved. In Part II below, we develop a context for critiquing all of
the standard judicial approaches to claims of constitutional academic
freedom. Part II briefly introduces the idea of fundamental underly-
ing purposes or missions of major universities.4 1 We then draw upon
the explicit understanding of the universities themselves as to the vi-
tal role that academic freedom must play in promoting the basic pur-
poses or missions of the university.42
We then note the distinction between the academic freedom of indi-
vidual faculty members and groups thereof on the one hand, and aca-
demic freedom as institutional autonomy and self-directedness at the
level of the university administration or board of trustees on the
other.4 3 This distinction is then used to briefly address the extent to
which private universities with distinctive religious missions might ei-
ther fit or not fit within the academic freedom paradigm. 44 We then
more generally link academic freedom to basic values and purposes
underlying the idea of constitutional protection for free speech. 45
In light of the above, we briefly characterize the sorts of academic
freedom that are most worthy of constitutional protection as "emer-
gent phenomena."4 6 The point is not to trace historically or through
case law how academic freedom has developed or been limited. In-
stead, we borrow the idea of "emergence" in a loosely philosophical
sense.4 7 The idea is roughly that an object can come into being with
important characteristics that could not have been inferred from the
elements and circumstances that have combined to create the emer-
gent phenomenon. In this case, the emergent phenomenon is aca-
demic freedom worthy of constitutional protection.
Based on this understanding, Part III critiques a number of as-
pects of the major contemporary judicial tests applied to claims of aca-
demic freedom. None of the major judicial tests and their offshoots
work well, and all are commonly inappropriate.4 8 A brief conclusion49
emphasizes that the scope and strength of academic freedom should
track not the current judicial tests, but instead the considerations de-
grievances to constitutional status would seem consistent with either of these
theories.
41. See infra section II.A.
42. See infra section II.B.
43. See infra section LI.C.
44. See infra section II.D.
45. See infra section II.E.
46. See infra section II.E.
47. See infra section II.E.
48. See infra Part III.
49. See infra Part IV.
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veloped in Part II. In particular, constitutional protection of academic
freedom should track the logic of academic freedom as an "emergent"
phenomenon5 0 in the context of university missions and the efficient
pursuit of those missions. This will generally require more rigorous
First Amendment protection of academic freedom than is currently
afforded.
II. THE UNIVERSITY AND THE LOGIC OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. University Missions
If academic freedom is to be found worthy of constitutional protec-
tion in even limited circumstances, surely it must be defended, as
must freedom of speech itself as a constitutional value, largely in
terms of the purposes underlying academic freedom and freedom of
speech. In a generally similar way, we can also think of a major uni-
versity as having aims, values, missions, or purposes that it fulfills
more or less well. These aims will tend to be similar among the major
nonreligious universities.
As it turns out, at least some of the most widely recognized pur-
poses of major universities are directly and substantially, indeed in-
dispensably, supported by freedom of speech and by academic
freedom. The typical major contemporary university, simply put, can-
not reasonably fulfill its basic purposes without relevant dimensions
of freedom of speech, and specifically academic freedom. To best see
this, we must specify some of the most important purposes or values
underlying freedom of speech and see how these purposes in turn ei-
ther directly support, or are in fact identical with, basic purposes,
functions, and goals of the university.
Our starting point could easily vary, but for the sake of a start, we
might begin with the current statement of overall mission and core
values of the University of Cambridge.5 1 Cambridge declares that its
mission "is to contribute to society through the pursuit of education,
learning, and research at the highest international levels of excel-
lence."5 2 The university emphasizes the contribution it "can make to
society through the pursuit, dissemination, and application of knowl-
edge."53 Cambridge cites only two core values, the first being "free-
50. See infra Part IV.
51. See The University's Mission and Core Values, http://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/
univ/mission.html (last visited June 10, 2006).
52. Id.
53. Id.
[Vol. 85:793
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dom of thought and expression,"54 and the second being "freedom from
discrimination." 55
A similar sense of mission is conveyed by the University of Oxford.
Oxford's mission statement refers to excellence in teaching and re-
search, and to "enriching the international, national, and regional
communities through the fruits of its research and the skills of its
graduates."56 To similar effect, Harvard College, the undergraduate
program of Harvard University, specifies that "Harvard strives to cre-
ate knowledge,5 7 to open the minds of students to that knowledge, and
to enable students to take best advantage of their educational oppor-
tunities."5 8 The Harvard College Mission Statement then immedi-
ately specifies that "[t]o these ends, the College encourages students
to respect ideas and their free expression."59
54. Id.
55. Id. Cambridge does not address therein the possibilities of conflict between their
two core values. For discussion of resolving some such conflicts under United
States constitutional principles, see R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of
Constitutional Values, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 527 (2006).
56. Mission Statement of University of Oxford: 2000, http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/
admi/mission.shtml (last modified Feb. 4, 2002).
57. The emphasis on the creation and dissemination of new knowledge, according to
T.H. Huxley, was not characteristic of the university in all historic eras. Huxley
has been quoted as maintaining in a letter of April 11, 1892, that "[tihe medieval
university looked backward; it professed to be a storehouse of old knowledge....
The modern university looks forward, and is a factory of new knowledge." ROB-
ERT ANDREWS, THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 947 (1993). Presuma-
bly, any university would strike one sort of balance or another between the two, if
only for the sake of its preferred orientation.
58. What is Harvard's Mission Statement, www.harvard.edu/siteguide/faqs/faqllO.
html (last visited June 10, 2006).
59. Id. See also University of Michigan, Mission Statement, http://www.umich.edul
pres/mission.html (last visited June 18, 2006) ("The mission of the University of
Michigan is to serve the people of Michigan and the world through preeminence
in creating, communicating, preserving and applying knowledge, art, and aca-
demic values, and in developing leaders and citizens who will challenge the pre-
sent and enrich the future."); The University of Texas at Austin, Core Purpose
and Values, http://www.utexas.edu/welcome/mission.html (last visited June 19,
2006) (stating that "[t]he university contributes to the advancement of society
through research, creative activity, scholarly inquiry and the development of new
knowledge" and referencing "[flreedom-to seek the truth and express it" as a
"core value"). Under the admittedly distinctive historical influence of Thomas
Jefferson, the current Statement of Purpose and Goals of the University of Vir-
ginia begins by declaring that "[t]he central purpose of the University of Virginia
is to enrich the mind by stimulating and sustaining a spirit of inquiry directed to
understanding the nature of the universe and the role of mankind in it." Univer-
sity of Virginia, Statement of Purpose and Goals, http://www.virginia.edu/
statementofpurpose/purpose.html (last visited June 19, 2006). See also, e.g., Role
and Mission of the University of Southern California, http://www.usc.edu/about/
mission (last visited June 19, 2006) ("The central mission of the University of
Southern California is the development of human beings and society as a whole
through the cultivation and enrichment of the human mind and spirit.").
2007]
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B. University Missions and Academic Freedom
We see from these and other representative university mission
statements 60 that mission statements from influential public and pri-
vate universities tend to emphasize some common themes. Among
these, certainly, are research and the generation and transmission of
knowledge directly to students, and perhaps less directly, in some
form to broader publics.61 The effective pursuit of these aims is typi-
cally thought to require one form or another of academic freedom or
freedom of thought and discussion.62
Similar, if not magnified, senses of the university's mission, and
even of the necessary role of some form of academic freedom in fulfil-
ling that mission, can be drawn from the broader culture as well.
John Donne exclaimed enthusiastically that "[t]he University is a Par-
adise, Rivers of Knowledge are there, Arts and Sciences flow from
thence[,] bottomless depths of unsearchable Counsels there."63 More
poignantly, Thomas Hardy's young Jude Fawley reflects in this way
on the distant Christminster:
"It is a city of light," he said to himself.
"The tree of knowledge grows there," he added a few steps further on.
"It is a place that teachers of men spring from and go to."
"It is what you may call a castle, manned by scholarship and religion."6 4
60. See, for example, those collected supra note 59. For a condensed survey and his-
tory of university missions and modern academic freedom with pointed commen-
tary, see Lee C. Bollinger, Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture on Academic Freedom
(Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.columbia.edu/news/05/03/cardozolec-
ture.html. President Bollinger emphasizes the university mission of inculcating
intellectual virtues. For one reaction by a fellow free speech specialist, see Post-
ing of Steven Shiffrin to Left2Right, http://left2right.typepad.com/main/2005/11
bollinger-acade.html (Nov. 25, 2005, 14:30 EST).
61. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text. In the case of Harvard, see the
early expression of President Charles W. Eliot, Academic Freedom, 26 SCIENCE 1,
1-12 (1907). It is certainly also possible to value the autonomy associated with
some forms of academic freedom for its own sake. The emphasis in most of the
university mission statements that explicitly address academic freedom, how-
ever, is rather more on the instrumental value of academic freedom to the further
aims and purposes of the university, including the acquisition and dissemination
of knowledge. This instrumental focus is clearly central to most judicial accounts
as well. See, e.g., Pugel v. Bd. of Trs., 378 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 2004) (referring
to "the University's mission of intellectual enhancement and research").
63. John Donne, Title page to DOROTHY L. SAYERS, GAUDY NIGHT (Harper 1995)
(1936) (quote used as a prefatory epigram to a mystery set largely at an Oxford
University reunion). A bit more prosaically, the philosopher D.W. Hamlyn opines
that "whatever branches of knowledge a university concentrates on, and for
whatever reason, the overriding consideration ought to be the furtherance of
knowledge both now and in the future." D.W. Hamlyn, The Concept of a Univer-
sity, 71 PHIL. 205, 218 (1996).
64. THOMAS HARDY, JUDE THE OBSCURE 30 (Signet 1980) (1895). See also EVELYN
WAUGH, BRIDESHEAD REVISITED 21 (Back Bay Books 1999) (1944) ("Oxford, in
those days,... exhaled the soft vapours of a thousand years of learning.").
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The metaphor of light is taken up not only in the famous Yale motto of
"Lux et Veritas,"65 but in judgments, such as that of Benjamin Dis-
raeli, that "[a] University should be a place of light, of liberty, and of
learning."6 6
By way of summary, we have John Henry Newman's classic decla-
ration that
a university ... is the place to which a thousand schools make contributions;
in which the intellect may safely range and speculate, sure to find its equal in
some antagonist activity, and its judge in the tribunal of truth. It is a place
where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified and perfected, and
rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision of mind with
mind, and knowledge with knowledge.
6 7
Newman's formulation, too, brings some idea of academic freedom into
the descriptive essence of the university at its best, particularly in its
reference to the space within which "the intellect may safely range
and speculate. "68
Certainly the leading universities themselves endorse in various
and broader contexts some idea of academic freedom as closely sup-
portive of, if not inherent in, at least some portion of the university
mission. The important 1915 Declaration of Principles adopted by the
American Association of University Professors endorsed academic
freedom in the sense of "freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of
teaching within the university or college; and freedom of extramural
utterance and action."6 9 Contemporary declarations by major individ-
ual universities generally track and expand on this early expression.
As a reasonably typical further example, consider some key ele-
ments of the academic freedom and responsibility policy adopted by
the University of Pennsylvania: 70
It is the policy of the University of Pennsylvania to maintain and en-
courage freedom of inquiry, discourse, teaching, research, and publication and
to protect any member of the academic staff against influences, from within or
without the University, that would restrict him or her in the exercise of these
freedoms in his or her area of scholarly interest. The teacher is entitled to
freedom in research and in the publication of results, subject to... the institu-
65. See, e.g., The Yale University Shield, http://www.yale.edu/secretary/yale-shield.
html (last visited June 20, 2006).
66. See ANDREWS, supra note 57, at 947, available at http://www.bartleby.com/66/18/
16818.html.
67. JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY 472-73 (1927).
68. Id. at 472.
69. COMM. ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM & ACADEMIC TENURE, AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFES-
soRs, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES (1915), http://www.akronaaup.org/docu-
ments/AAUP1915.pdf.
70. UNIV. OF PA., HANDBOOK FOR FACULTY & ACADEMIC ADMINISTRATORS: A SELEC-
TION OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA (2006),
http://www.upenn.edu/assoc-provost/handbook/iia.html [hereinafter UNIV. OF
PA., HANDBOOK].
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tional policies and procedures as set forth in the research policies of the
University....
The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his or her
subject. 7 1
Crucially for our purposes, the policy then adds, in apparently non-
mandatory language,7 2 that "the teacher should remember that the
public may judge the profession and the institution by his or her utter-
ances. Hence, the teacher should at all times show respect for the
opinions of others, and should indicate when he or she is not speaking
for the institution."73
Similar sentiments are expressed by other private74 as well as
public75 universities, by universities not subject to United States con-
stitutional or statutory law, 7 6 by international instrument, 77 and by
71. Id.
72. Many discussions of academic freedom and its responsibilities rely on both
mandatory or prohibitory language and on language that is apparently more as-
pirational or merely precatory and apparently less formally enforceable, if en-
forceable at all.
73. UNrV. OF PA., HANDBOOK, supra note 70.
74. See, e.g., STANFORD UNIV., RESEARCH POLICY HANDBOOK (1998), http://www.
stanford.edu/dept/DoR/rph/rph-pdf/2-3.pdf ("Stanford University's central func-
tions of teaching, learning, research, and scholarship depend upon an atmos-
phere in which freedom of inquiry, thought, expression, publication, and
peaceable assembly are given the fullest protection.").
75. See, e.g., Univ. of Ca., General University Policy Regarding Academic Appointees:
Academic Freedom (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.ucop.edu/acadadv/acadpers/apm/
apm-010.pdf ("The University of California is committed to upholding and pre-
serving principles of academic freedom. These principles reflect the University's
fundamental mission, which is to discover knowledge and to disseminate it to
students and to society at large."). This of course is not to suggest in the slightest
that the leading universities have invariably followed their own basic logic in
matters of academic freedom.
76. See, e.g., University of Toronto, Statements of Institutional Purpose: Purpose of
the University (Oct. 15, 1992), http://www.utoronto.ca/govcncl/pap/policies/
mission.html#_Toc468159531 ("Within the unique university context, the most
crucial of all human rights are the rights of freedom of speech, academic freedom,
and freedom of research. And we affirm that these rights are meaningless unless
they entail the right to raise deeply disturbing questions and provocative chal-
lenges to the cherished beliefs of society at large and of the university itself.").
Actually, it is far from clear what is to be gained, apart perhaps from some emo-
tive force, from characterizing academic freedom as a "human right." To be an
academic is to occupy a narrowly specialized and distinctive niche among all
forms of gainful employment. Academic freedom presupposes complex institu-
tional roles and responsibilities, such that it would be more misleading than illu-
minating to say that a given academic is entitled to academic freedom simply, or
even primarily, in virtue merely of being a sentient, aspiring human. Nor does it
seem advisable, as the University of Toronto formulation appears to do, to distin-
guish academic freedom in this context from the academic's "freedom of re-
search." See id.
77. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FIRST GLOBAL COLLOQUIUM OF UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS:
STATEMENT ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM art. I-III (Michael W. Doyle et al. ed., 2005),
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/president/communications%20files/globalcolloquium
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scholars of the university itself.7 8 Cumulatively, it becomes clear that
the consensus holds that the mission or basic purposes of the univer-
sity are, in one way or another, inseparable from or crucially depen-
dent upon familiar formulations of the idea of academic freedom.
C. Individual and Institutional Academic Freedom
A fundamental ambiguity that must be addressed in substantive
terms, however, is between the academic freedom of individuals or
groups of academics on the one hand, and, on the other, the academic
freedom of the university itself, as a collective institution, chiefly spo-
ken for by the university administration and the university's board of
governors or trustees. Classic statements by particular Justices on ac-
ademic freedom have sometimes focused entirely on the latter institu-
tional sense. Justice Powell's crucial opinion in Bakke,79 for example,
focused on academic freedom in the sense of the university's freedom
to decide "who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study."8 0
While the courts sometimes minimize the former, individualized
sense of academic freedom at the expense of the latter, institutional
.htm (discussing a 1950 UNESCO statement at Nice, France, which upheld "[tihe
right to pursue knowledge for its own sake and to follow wherever the truth may
lead," despite inserting a concomitant responsibility of some sort on the part of
scholars and teachers to "resist corrupting influences" and to "transcend parti-
sanship and prejudice").
78. See, e.g., JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE IDEA OF THE UNIVERsITY: A RE-EXAMINATION 48
(1992) (stating that "[fireedom of inquiry is an intellectual value upon which the
life of the university as a center of research and teaching depends," even under
political regimes that neither recognize nor respect anything like our familiar
free speech law under the First Amendment, in the course of referring to the
university's "two fundamental intellectual virtues" as "free inquiry and intellec-
tual honesty"). Substantial genuine freedom of inquiry may well encourage intel-
lectual honesty, and if intellectual honesty diminishes, the realistic practical
value of any associated of freedom of inquiry may tend to decrease as well.
Again, enforcing freedom of inquiry will always face subtle obstacles, but at-
tempting to enforce intellectual honesty, even if a university were so disposed,
seems even more inherently unmanageable. See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, THE IDEAL
OF THE UNIVERSITY 131 (1969) (holding the ideal university's purpose to be "the
preservation and advancement of learning and the pursuit of truth in an atmos-
phere of freedom and mutual respect, in which the intellectual freedoms of teach-
ing, expression, research, and debate are guaranteed absolutely"); Robert M.
Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America, 4 J. HIGHER EDUC. 1, 1 (1933) (pri-
vate and public universities as struggling to "maintain the right of the scholar to
exercise his intelligence even though it led him to criticize established policies or
institutions").
79. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting the classic
formulation of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
80. Id.
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autonomy form,8 1 we have herein been in the process of developing
the logic of protecting the more individualized sort of academic free-
dom as well.8 2 Certainly the Supreme Court has at least on occasion
seemed open to the meaningfulness of both forms of academic free-
dom. The Court has, for example, recognized that "[alcademic free-
dom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of
ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsis-
tently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself."
8 3
Both sorts of academic freedom must be recognized8 4 and accorded
their proper places. There may certainly be conflicts, for example, be-
tween individual professional academic freedom and the power and
authority of a university administration to set academic standards,
broadly understood, in various respects.8 5 By contrast, the academic
freedom of individual professors and of the university as a whole
might also be threatened simultaneously, if to different degrees.
8 6
Forces of one sort or another external to the university8 7 may ally
81. See, for example, the cases cited supra notes 14, 18.
82. See generally Parts II-III.
83. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985), quoted in Bd. of
Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 237 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring); Brown
v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 951 (9th Cir. 2002) (failure to approve "Disacknowledge-
ments" section of student thesis); Edwards v. Cal. Univ., 156 F.3d 488, 492 (3d
Cir. 1998) (university control over professor's curriculum and course materials).
84. See, e.g., Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985)
(noting "both the freedom of the academy ... and the freedom of the individual
teacher"); Hamlyn, supra note 63, at 207 ("Let me start with academic freedom.
It is important here whether one is concerned with the institution or with the
individual member of it."); David M. Rabban, Functional Analysis of 'Individual'
and 'Institutional' Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 227 (1990). But cf. WOLFF, supra note 78, at 107 ("Presidents
and trustees never hesitate to speak and act in the name of their universities, but
it is hard to see what right they have to do so."). For judicial recognition in dicta
of the individual form of academic freedom in the law school setting, see Blum v.
Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1011 (2d Cir. 1994) ("To fulfill these many roles, law
schools promote an environment characterized by the active exercise of First
Amendment rights. Indeed, free and open debate on issues of public concern are
essential to a law school's function."). Generally, academic freedom only very
partially overlaps with, and must not be confined to, issues of public concern. See
infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Edwards, 156 F.3d at 492.
86. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (New York state stat-
ute and regulations barring public school employment to anyone teaching the se-
ditious or forcible overthrow of government as unconstitutionally vague and
violative of the First Amendment).
87. Such external forces could potentially include, at a minimum, any branch and
level of state or federal government, corporations and employers, funding agen-
cies, foundations, accrediting agencies, donors and alumni, educational and more
broadly political interest groups, any form of media, and religious denomina-
tional organizations and interest groups. Presumably, any external person or
group issuing any threat beyond the influence of sheer persuasive argument in
some appropriate channel or forum could potentially qualify.
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themselves with either individual professors or with the university ad-
ministration in opposition to the academic freedom of the other.
Often, an externally imposed limit on either form of academic freedom
will tend to indirectly jeopardize the other form, to some degree, as
well.88 But there are also interventions, directed at the university ad-
ministration, that are intended precisely to limit the university's abil-
ity to restrict individual academic freedom.8 9
D. Religious Private University Missions and Academic
Freedom
The potential for conflict between academic freedom of individual
faculty and academic freedom as autonomous pursuit of university
mission is particularly clear in the subset of private universities with
religious affiliations and distinctive religiously influenced missions.
Such institutions are not all alike with respect to individual academic
freedom. But we can imagine that at least some schools with religious
doctrinal missions may be particularly skeptical of employing faculty
who "ride with the cops and cheer[] for the robbers,"9 0 as the school
defines those roles. Or at least, that some such schools may wish to
retain some designated critical percentage of faculty deemed support-
ive of the university's religious mission. 9 1
Some religious schools seem keenly aware of some of the difficul-
ties they face in reconciling fidelity to mission with academic free-
88. See, e.g., Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 592 (involving state law that imposed binding
substantive limits or requirements on what public university teachers in particu-
lar could believe and teach). Any such restriction is presumably a limitation to
some degree on university autonomy as well as on individual faculty members.
89. Thus, an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 might involve an individual profes-
sor's recourse to a federal statute to prevent action under color of state law that
would be allegedly violative of the plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment
free speech rights. See, e.g., Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 820-21 (7th Cir.
2000) (Posner, J.) (alleged denial of pay raise for several faculty at public two-
year college allegedly based on plaintiffs critical speech). And while
whistleblower statutes are not generally designed to protect individual academic
freedom, there may be some occasional overlap between the two interests. See
Marni M. Zack, Note, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy Reasons For Re-
jecting a Per Se Rule Precluding Free Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. REV. 893, 916-17
(2005).
90. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. The faculty percentage deemed critical might range from 50% to 100%. See, e.g.,
Alan Jacobs, To Be a Christian College, FIRST THINGS, Apr. 2006, at 17, 17-20,
available at http://www.firsthings.comftissues/ftO6O4/articles/jacobs.html; Apos-
tolic Constitution of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul II on Catholic Universities
(Aug. 15, 1990), http://www.brescia.uwo.ca/about/governmance/policies/ex_corde_
ecclesiae.pdf. For a critique of the latter, see Daniel C. Maguire, Academic Free-
dom and the Vatican's Ex Corde Eccelsiae, ACADEME, May-June 2002, at 46,
46-50, available at http://www.aaup.org/publications/Academe/200202mj/02mj
mag.htm.
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dom. 92 The very possibility of a sustained reconciliation of one sort or
another of a distinctive faith mission commitment with individual aca-
demic freedom is contestable. 93 There are no shortcuts to resolving
such issues, in particular cases or in the abstract. Universities with
distinctive religious missions can as institutions add to the range and
diversity of thinking and of background assumptions among the set of
all universities. They can raise distinctive intellectual considerations,
or at least emphasize what is elsewhere relatively neglected.
On the other side of the balance sheet, inevitably, any ways in
which individual academic freedom may be distinctively impaired at
such institutions must be entered. These would include any distinc-
tive pressure toward orthodoxy exerted by any means extending be-
yond dialogic persuasion into the realm of significant threats. A
religious school might in some respects add to diversity of thought
among educational institutions in general while simultaneously re-
stricting diversity of belief and expression on its own campus.
Inescapably, in striking the balance on academic freedom in such
cases, we must, at some point, assess as well the merit or value of the
beliefs that may be either required or prohibited on a given campus.
Freedom, and certainly both freedom of speech in general and aca-
demic freedom in particular, cannot be reduced entirely to the mere
92. Consider the debate on the Notre Dame campus, as documented in M. Cathleen
Kaveny, The Perfect Storm, AMERICA, May 8, 2006, at 14 (distinguishing a "cur-
rent of openness," a "current of identity," and an incipient "current of engage-
ment" that would seek to avoid either "assimilation" or "isolation"); John I.
Jenkins, President, Univ. of Notre Dame, Address to the Faculty, Academic Free-
dom and Catholic Character: An Invitation to Reflection and Response (Jan. 23,
2006), available at http://president.nd.edu/academic-freedom/address-text.shtml;
University of Notre Dame, Common Proposal of Chairs of the College of Arts and
Letters and Fr. Jenkins, http://president.nd.edu/closingstatement/commonpro-
posal (last visited Apr. 8, 2006).
93. Compare, e.g., WOLFF, supra note 78, at 129 (stating that by some interpreta-
tions, "the phrase 'Catholic University' is a strict contradiction in terms," with
the contradiction lying not in religious devoutness, but in any surrender by a
purported member of the community of learning of their ultimate autonomy or
reservation of judgment on matters of doctrine), with Statement on Academic
Freedom at BYU, http://fc.byu.edu/tpages/tchlrn/acadfree.html (last visited June
19, 2006) (maintaining that the BYU approach to religion and academic freedom
involves not "narrowing the scope of freedom but ... enabling greater (or at least
different) and much prized freedoms"). See Michael W. McConnell, Academic
Freedom in Religious Colleges and Universities, 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303,
304 (1990) ("To impose the secular norm of academic freedom on unwilling relig-
ious colleges and universities would increase the homogeneity-and decrease the
vitality--of American intellectual life."); George M. Marsden, Liberating Aca-
demic Freedom, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1993, at 11, 11-14, available at http://www.
leaderu.com/ftissues/ft9812/opinion/marsden.html; James Neuchterlein, The Idol
of Academic Freedom, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 1993, at 12, 12-16, available at http:l
www.leaderu.com/ftissues/ft9312/articles/nuechterlein.html; Alan Finder, Feel-
ing Strains, Baptist College Cut Church Ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at Al.
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number of things one can do or say.9 4 Value assessments must enter
in as well.9 5 Some matters are understood to be more important than
others.9 6 Some religiously motivated beliefs cannot add enough value
in terms of diversity of thought to make up for the broadly recognized
disvalue of the ways in which they rend the social fabric in a pluralis-
tic society, apart from the costs in individual academic freedom they
may impose.9 7 Classically, a religiously motivated institutional belief,
translated into school policy, may fall afoul of basic federal civil rights
legislation and be unworthy of protection for that reason.9 8
Diversity, or diversification, of thought and belief is clearly related
to freedom of speech and to the basic values underlying free speech.99
But part of the value of diversity in general in many contexts, not lim-
ited to investmentslOO or environmental health,O1 is in reducing the
risks of genuinely bad outcomes. 1 0 2 A school that cites its own institu-
tional academic freedom, or the value of diversity, in defense of what
is widely deemed, even at law, already a genuinely bad outcome, has
not thereby raised a persuasive claim. There must at some point come
a limit to our collective self-restraint and deference to an institution
born of our sense of our own collective biases and fallibility. At that
point, there must arise a willingness to defend crucial rights and val-
ues jeopardized by institutional academic freedom in a particular uni-
versity context.
E. Free Speech Values and Academic Freedom
To better understand the nature and value of academic freedom in
various contexts, we must briefly link the idea of academic freedom to
94. See, e.g., MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM 387 (2003); CHRISTINE
SWANTON, FREEDOM: A COHERENCE THEORY 190 (1992).
95. See supra note 94.
96. A faculty member's ability to speak freely or within limits on admissions and civil
rights at a religious institution, or freely on the content of the academic subject
for which the faculty member was hired and holds recognized special expertise, is
generally more significant to academic freedom than the freedom to dilate on
scarce or inconvenient parking or dining accommodations, for example.
97. This, again, is not to pretend that academic freedom at a distinctive religious
institution, or the academic diversity that is added by that institution, can be
neatly quantified and commensurated. See supra note 94. But not all non-quan-
tified judgments among incommensurable choices need be subjective and
arbitrary.
98. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (involving denial of
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory institution).
99. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 108, 121 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed.,
Penguin Books 1974) (1859).
100. See, e.g., R. George Wright, Dominance and Diversity: A Risk-Reduction Ap-
proach to Free Speech Law, 34 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (1999).
101. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home-Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1053, 1059 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (Henderson, J., concurring); Wright, supra note 100, at 17-20.
102. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 100, at 9-10.
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two of the standardly recognized basic purposes or values underlying
the idea of special constitutional protection for speech. In particular,
we should focus on the linkages between academic freedom and the
free speech values of the pursuit of truth and of collective self-develop-
ment. Both of these free speech values have already been met above
as goals practically inseparable from the effective execution of central
elements of the university mission.103
That the free speech values of the pursuit of truth and of collective
self-development support academic freedom, even apart from the mis-
sion and policy statements cited above, should not be surprising.
Some years ago, for example, Robert M. Hutchins declared broadly
that "[t]he arguments for academic freedom are the same as those for
freedom of speech."10 4 Such arguments are in a way actually some-
what misleading. Freedom of speech shields everyone against certain
forms of government interference, but academic freedom makes policy
sense in only a specialized set of circumstances. But there is certainly
much to Hutchins' argument.
The pursuit of truth as a crucial value not only to the university
but also to freedom of speech has been classically defended by John
Stuart Mill.105 This defense does not rely on any assumption that an
unpopular speaker is likely to be right and the regulating authority
wrong.10 6 Academic freedom similarly does not stand or fall on any-
one's view of the truth or falsity of a contested claim made by the aca-
demic figure in question. The logic of academic freedom, given the
103. See supra notes 51-78 and accompanying text. Professor Robert Post has argued
that
justifications for academic freedom do [not] rest on individual autonomy
or democracy or the marketplace of ideas [or the advancement of knowl-
edge], but instead on a particular idea of the institutional mission of a
University. Academic freedom creates protections that are grounded in
a view of the purposes of a university.
Robert Post, Address to the Academic Freedom Forum, Academic Freedom: Its
History and Evolution Within the UC System 1 (June 11, 2003), available at
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/senate/committees/ucaf/afforum/post.pdf.
Professor Post essentially equates "the advancement of knowledge" and "the mar-
ketplace of ideas" in his statement. There seems to be no sufficient justification,
however, for this sharp distinction between free speech values and the mission of
a university. As we shall continue to see, they seem practically inseparable, at
least if the university mission is to be effectively pursued.
104. Robert M. Hutchins, The Meaning and Significance of Academic Freedom, 300
ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 72, 72 (1955) (citing MILL, supra note 99).
105. See MILL, supra note 99, at 76-77; THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1818 REPORT FOR THE
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 459-60 (Mer-
rill D. Peterson ed., Library of Am. 1984); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifi-
cations, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130-33 (1989); see generally William P. Marshall,
In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L.
REV. 1 (1995).
106. See, for example, the excerpt from John Stuart Mill in Hutchins, supra note 104,
at 72.
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university mission of furthering the truth, does require, however, that
academics be generally selected in the first place in part based on
their distinctive subject matter expertise. There would be little point
in the Harvard motto of "Veritas"0o if the Harvard faculty were gen-
erally no more capable of approaching truth in any given field than
the untrained.lO8
The dramatic battles between unorthodox truth-seekers and vari-
ous forces of repression, however well or ill motivated, have always
been of interest.'0 9 The pursuit of truth, however haltingly under-
taken, will doubtless remain central to the broad university mission.
Admittedly, the very idea of truth itself has experienced something of
a downsizing of late in some academic circles. "Truth" in certain
realms has been discussed under rubrics including skepticism, incre-
dulity before metanarratives, fictionalism, minimalism, deflationism,
constructivism, conventionalism, nihilism, extreme contextualism,
nominalism, subjectivism, noncognitivism, expressivism, quasi-real-
ism, irrealism, anti-realism, projectivism, emotivism, relativism, and
error theory.11o
107. For background, see Arthur J. Langguth, Nothing But the Truth, HARV. CRIMSON
ONLINE, Oct. 6, 1953, http://www.thecrimson.harvard.edu/article.aspx?ref=
209484.
108. While academic freedom also extends beyond statements within the individual's
area of special expertise, as on political matters addressed in a broader public
forum, it is important not to seek to confine academic freedom to matters of sub-
jective interest to the general public. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying
text.
109. See, e.g., Kay v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 18 N.Y.S.2d 821 (Sup. Ct.) (preventing Ber-
trand Russell from teaching at City College of New York due to alleged sexual
immorality and controversial views on premarital sex and other moral issues),
affd mem., 20 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (App. Div. 1940); THE BERTRAND RUSSELL CASE
(John Dewey & Horace M. Kallen ed., De Capo Press 1972) (1941) (discussing
Russell's case); THOMAS C. BRICKHOUSE & NICHOLAS D. SMITH, SOCRATES ON
TRIAL 197-200 (1989) (noting that Socrates himself rejected legal or other inter-
ference with his teaching, but did not himself feel subjectively free in teaching, as
opposed to acting pursuant to divine command); THE GALILEO AFFAIR: A Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY 287-91 (Maurice A. Finocchiaro ed. & trans., 1989) (describing
Galileo's "Sentence (22 June 1633)"); JEROME LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LEE, IN-
HERIT THE WIND 72 (Random House 2003) (1955) ("[H]e is threatened with fine
and imprisonment because he chooses to speak what he thinks.... ."); PLATO, The
Apology, in FIVE DIALOGUES: EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, MENO, PHAEDO
(G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett 2002); C.D.C. REEVE, SOCRATES IN THE APOLOGY
123 (1989) (discussing Socrates as teacher); Pope John Paul II, Discourse at the
Plenary Academic Session, On the Centenary of the Birth of Albert Einstein para.
6 (Nov. 10, 1979), available at http://www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/JP2A
LEIN.HTM.
110. For discussion, see Ronald Dworkin, We Need A New Interpretation of Academic
Freedom, in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 181, 183 (Louis Menard ed.,
1996); Thomas L. Haskell, Justifying the Rights of Academic Freedom in the Era
of "Power/Knowledge," in THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra, at 43,
72-73; Larry Alexander, Academic Freedom, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 883 (2006);
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But these trends, singly or together, do not immediately threaten
to undermine university missions or the pursuit of truth as underpin-
ning free speech and academic freedom in particular. The idea of
truth as somehow reducible to political power, for one, has been famil-
iar for several thousand years.'1 1 Yet the tax- and tuition-paying pub-
lic seems in no hurry, at least on that basis, either to judge truth to no
longer be worth the cost of tuition or else to displace the views of
professors generally with their own preferred views. We see contem-
porary attacks on academic freedom, but rarely on the grounds that
the attenuation of the idea of truth in the academy legitimizes such an
attack.
The continuing stability of academic freedom in general may in
part reflect the range of academics, including architects and engi-
neers, for whom it is commonly true that the bridge stands, or it is
true that the bridge collapses, with few subtleties.112 It is also per-
haps partly a matter of the second linkage among university missions,
free speech values other than the pursuit of truth, and the case for
protected academic freedom.
This refers in particular to the second of the relevant basic free
speech values, that of collective self-realization and development. 113
Here again, we see a near identity between, on the one hand, how the
university, in large part through academic freedom,114 seeks to con-
David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 1377 (1998) (reviewing THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra); and
Steven D. Smith, Skepticism, Tolerance, and Truth in the Theory of Free Expres-
sion, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 649 (1986). For brief defining entries of these varied,
partially overlapping, partially contradictory terms operating at different levels,
see, for example, SIMON BLACKBURN, OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (2d ed.
2005).
111. Consider that rhetoricians such as Callicles and Thrasymachus, whatever their
roles in Socrates' fate, seem not to have permanently undermined the case for
academic freedom in the minds of the public. See PLATO, GORGIAS 50-52 (W.
Helmhold trans., 1952); THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 15-21 (Francis M. Cornford
trans., 1945).
112. But for some hazy alternatives not necessarily downsizing the idea of truth, see,
for example, THE GHOST IN THE ATOM: A DISCUSSION OF THE MYSTERIES OF QUAN-
TUM PHYSICS (P.C.W. Davies & Julian R. Brown eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
1993) (1986); Guido Bacciagaluppi, The Role of Decoherence in Quantum Mechan-
iCs, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., Summer 2005, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2005/entries/qm-decoherence/.
113. See generally, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
591 (1982); Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998). Classically, see MILL, supra note 99, at 95-97,
121-23, where Mill emphasizes the effects of free speech on cultural development
as well as on individuals, and on collective progress as well as on individual
autonomy.
114. This is not to suggest that literally everyone's flourishing in every sense depends
upon vigorous university academic freedom or on freedom of speech in general.
The occasional martyr, civil rights leader, revolutionary, and perhaps even the
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tribute to cultural development,115 and, on the other, how freedom of
speech in general is valued in part for just such reasons. 1 16 John Stu-
art Mill's progressive defense of free speech, for example, led him so
far as to hold that "the men and women who at present inhabit the
more civilized parts of the world . . .assuredly are but starved speci-
mens of what nature can and will produce."11 7
Focusing on the values of the pursuit of truth and of collective self-
realization and development thus clarifies the linkages among the
purposes of a university, academic freedom, and the protection worthi-
ness of some speech under the First Amendment. But not all speech is
constitutionally protected,1 ' 8 and not all speech uttered in some edu-
cation-related context qualifies as academic speech deserving protec-
tion under the distinctive rubric of academic freedom.
What kind of speech, then, in what circumstances, amounts to the
exercise of academic freedom qualifying for constitutional free speech
protection? We will see below how the courts have mishandled such
inquiries, typically through reliance on inappropriate tests. 119 The
scope of constitutional free speech protection properly accorded aca-
demic freedom is instead better informed by recourse to the logic of
university missions, university values, and the basic justifications for
academic freedom and for free speech in general.
Paying more direct attention to the crucial values promoted by the
university and by academic freedom would allow the courts to improve
over the current results of applying inappropriate tests drawn from
distant contexts. But there will remain some inescapable vagueness
in this area of the case law. There are no sharp boundaries and no
readily detectable "tipping points"120 at which academic freedom dra-
matically springs into being as a constitutional consideration.
occasional artist, may pose exceptions to the general rule. See, e.g., ELIZABETH
WILSON, SHOSTAKOVICH: A LIFE REMEMBERED (1994).
115. See, for example, the selected university mission and value statements referred
to supra notes 51-56, 59 and accompanying text.
116. See MILL, supra note 99, at 95-97, 121-23.
117. Id. at 72. The cultural development argument for freedom of speech, let alone for
academic freedom, does not depend upon Mill's Victorian assumptions as to hier-
archical cultural rankings.
118. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959-60 (2006) (deputy district
attorney's speech unprotected because it was pursuant to official duties as an
employee, rather than as a citizen on matters of personal interest); Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-48 (1983) (assistant district attorney's criticisms of em-
ployer found to be mainly on matters of personal interest, as an employee, rather
than speech as a citizen on matters of public interest and concern, given the con-
tent, form, and context of her speech, and thus worthy of only the most minimal
protection).
119. See infra Part III.
120. For a popular current discussion, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT:
How LITILE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (Little, Brown & Comp. 2002).
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Instead, we might think of protection-worthy academic freedom as
an entirely real and distinctive but "emergent" phenomenon. In the
simple sense in which we are interested in the term, an "emergent"
phenomenon, in this case academic freedom worthy of distinctive free
speech protection, is one with characteristics that transcend and are
not inferrable from or reducible to the properties of the elements that
have been combined to constitute the emergent phenomenon.121
In our context, we might start with the reasonable assumption that
freedom of speech is, as a matter of fairness and equality, protectable
for all those capable of asserting it. But are distinctive contexts, spe-
cial circumstances, social roles, and unique social functions of no con-
sequence in this regard? The university emerges in particular
circumstances with certain distinct roles and purposes. Just as salt
"emerges from" but does not share all the properties of sodium and
chlorine, so the university emerges in a certain educational and tech-
nical context, but is not reducible to its context or to other institutions.
We thus cannot say, for example, that Cambridge University and
the typical elementary school share precisely the same mission 122 and
values. Nor could we say that Stephen Hawking, an admittedly excep-
tional Cambridge professor 123 engaged in research on the frontier of
cosmology, 124 is doing essentially the same thing as any public ele-
mentary school teacher. Nor are the university research professor
and, say, the government-employed spy themselves relevantly simi-
larly situated for free speech purposes. 1 25
For more classic treatment, see THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND
MACROBEHAVIOR 99, 101-02 (1978).
121. For a brief survey of several versions of the idea, see Timothy O'Connor & Hong
Yu Wong, Emergent Properties, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., Sept. 24,
2004, http://plato.stanford.edulentries/properties-emergent. See also PHILIP
CLAYTON, MIND AND EMERGENCE, at vi (2004) ("Emergence is the view that new
and unpredictable phenomena are naturally produced by interactions in nature;
that these new structures, organisms, and ideas are not reducible to the subsys-
tems on which they depend; and that the newly evolved realities in turn exercise
a causal influence on the parts out of which they arose."); Timothy O'Connor,
Emergent Properties, 31 AM. PHIL. Q. 91, 91 (1994) (attempting to "clarify ...
discussion of "emergent hypotheses" (citing JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF
LOGIC bk. III, ch. 6, § 1)).
122. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text (elucidating the mission and val-
ues of Cambridge University). See also Vikram Amar & Alan Brownstein, Aca-
demic Freedom, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 17, 23 (2005) ("In elementary, junior high and
high schools, we think the argument for protecting the academic freedom of
teachers is largely unpersuasive. The academic role here has little to do with
research, the development of new knowledge, or freewheeling inquiry .... ").
123. For a biography, see JOHN BOSLOUGH, STEPHEN HAWKING'S UNIVERSE (1989).
124. See, e.g., STEPHEN W. HAWKING, THE THEORY OF EVERYTHING (New Millenium
Press 2002).
125. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1980) (enforceability of
CIA agent's employment agreement for judicially reviewable pre-publication
clearance by agency of any agency-related material for possible national security
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The CIA agent, the welfare worker, the third-grade teacher, and
the public university cosmologist all work for the government and all
equally deserve appropriate free speech protection. But the nature
and extent of that protection should reflect relevant differences in the
missions of their institutions, in the nature of their work, and in their
specific training and circumstances.
Some courts seem to rightly appreciate that recognizing academic
freedom as a distinctive component of free speech law reflects these
relevant differences, rather than mere rent seeking or some sort of
elitist grasping for arbitrary privilege. This recognition may be at
work in the university tenure denial case of Allworth v. Howard Uni-
versity.126 The Allworth court recognized "the university context"' 2 7
as one "where concepts of academic freedom and academic judgment
are so important that courts generally give deference to the discretion
exercised by university officials."128 A bit more specifically, the court
then emphasized judicial restraint "in such sensitive areas as faculty
appointment, promotion, and tenure, especially in institutions of
higher learning."i29 The court here at least recognizes relevant differ-
ences between institutions of higher learning, including universities,
and other broadly educational institutions. 130
We next turn in the following Part to a more detailed examination
of the free speech tests the courts have borrowed from other contexts
and applied, without modification and often inappropriately, in uni-
versity contexts. Such contexts often logically require recognition of
constitutionally enforceable academic freedom. At this point, we
implications). Snepp is distinguished, partly in light of the absence of national
security considerations, in the case ofHarman v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 111
(2d Cir. 1998), which dealt with preauthorization for welfare workers' public
interviews.
126. 890 A.2d 194 (D.C. 2006).
127. Id. at 202.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Brown v. George Washington Univ., 802 A.2d 382, 385 (D.C. 2002)).
Of course, the Allworth context involved collective or university administrative
autonomy rather than the academic freedom of an individual professor, as did the
quoted Brown. See also Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (stat-
ing that "a hearing may be 'useless or harmful in finding out the truth as to
scholarship'" (quoting Barnard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 102 N.E. 1095, 1097
(Mass. 1913))).
130. By contrast, consider the failure to recognize public university professors' re-
search as relevantly different from other loosely similar sorts of government
workplace activity, with the resulting concern for special privileging, elitism, and
anti-egalitariansim in the area of free speech rights, in Schrier v. University of
Colorado, 427 F.3d 1250, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005) (academic freedom as amounting
to a "special constitutional right ... not enjoyed by other governmental employ-
ees" presumed to be "similarly situated"); and Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,
411 n.13 (4th Cir. 2000) (referring to "the specter of a constitutional right enjoyed
by only a limited class of citizens").
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should simply appreciate that proper recognition of academic freedom
does not, as a matter of arbitrary favoritism, confer special constitu-
tional rights, either beyond or within the free speech right, on some
privileged class.
Academic freedom in this context is a matter of how institutions,
their missions, and distinctive academic roles and training properly
make a difference in the scope of First Amendment protection. Public
employee work roles can and do make a difference. We do not view
nonconfidential or nonpolicymaking governmental employees as hav-
ing special constitutional rights not available to other governmental
employees, even though their rights of political speech and affiliation
are clearly protected in some ways not available to other governmen-
tal employees.1 3 1 Instead, we recognize that confidential and noncon-
fidential government employees may not always be similarly situated
for free speech purposes. 13 2 Academic freedom, by analogy, depends
upon real and relevant differences among government employees.
III. THE CURRENT FREE SPEECH TESTS AS POORLY
ADAPTED TO THE LOGIC OF CONSTITUTIONAL
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Despite decades of litigation, the courts have yet to converge on
any particular approach to the free speech rights in various contexts of
teachers in public institutions. There are several main variations, but
none seems reasonably sensitive to the logic of university mission,
university values, and the role of specialized and trained individual
faculty within that context. We have seen that the most commonly
applied tests are variations of one sort or another of what we have
called the Hazelwood test133 and the Pickering-Connick-Garcetti or
PCG test.' 34
131. See the patronage employment trilogy of Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 327 (1976);
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); and Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois,
497 U.S. 62 (1990).
132. Nor do we seem troubled by any claim that welfare workers or teachers and
professors seem to have greater, special, or unequal rights to publicize their
thoughts by comparison with CIA agents. See supra note 125. Presumably this
reflects differences in their overall circumstances and contexts, not favoritism or
special and unequal rights. Likewise, we seem to be in no hurry to conclude that
the misleading speech of political candidates should be subject to government
regulation even remotely akin to the regulatory penalties that may be imposed
upon equally misleading commercial speakers. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, Advertising
and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1977).
133. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text. For an explanation of the circuit
split confined merely to the choice between Hazelwood and PCG, see Chiras v.
Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 617 n.29 (5th Cir. 2005) (providing cases).
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The authorization for applying the Hazelwood student-speech
test 13 5 to some instances of teacher speech stems from dicta in Hazel-
wood itself, where the Court declared that schools may impose reason-
able restrictions on teacher speech when it occurs in a nonpublic
forum1 36 and bears the arguable approval of the school itself.137 The
standard in such cases thus becomes whether the regulation of
teacher speech that is thought to bear the school's imprint is "reasona-
bly related to a legitimate pedagogical concern."138
Taken by itself, this standard, if applied to public university
professors in their classroom teaching, research, or scholarly publica-
tion, would clearly allow for excessive restriction on professorial
speech. Against the background of the direct contribution of academic
freedom to the central mission of the university, what amounts to
mere minimum scrutiny139 as the test for official censorship cannot
suffice. Suppose, for example, that a donor threatens to withhold a
substantial gift unless an unorthodox scholar is somehow penalized.
Can we say that the university's resulting penalty on that scholar is
rationally related to some legitimate pedagogical interest, as in receiv-
ing the substantial gift? Clearly it is.140 In fact, cultivating donors
might be judged even an important educational interest, and not
merely a legitimate interest. But then, equally clearly, the Hazelwood
test thus underprotects the professorial classroom speech thought to
fall within its scope.
If Hazelwood is to apply to any teacher speech, it is best confined to
the sorts of grade-level contexts from which it arose. The age and so-
phistication of the students clearly make a difference in this and other
free speech contexts. 14 1 With students below a certain level of age
135. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
136. Distinctions among kinds of public forums, including nonpublic fora, are difficult
to draw consistently. For noteworthy attempts, see Perry Education Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); and Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
137. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988), quoted in Kirkland
v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 801 (5th Cir. 1989) (probationary
school teacher's nonrenewal as allegedly based on disapproval of supplementary
reading list for world history class). In Kirkland, the court first worked through
the Pickering-Connick test. Id. at 797-99.
138. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273, quoted in Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch.
Dist., 42 F.3d 719, 723 (2d Cir. 1994) (plaintiff "teacher" was an outside guest
lecturer for tenth grade class, and thus might not have been able to trigger the
Pickering-Connick analysis requiring a government-employee speaker).
139. See, for example, the minimum scrutiny standard applied in the equal protection
context in New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-93
(1979).
140. See id.
141. See Silano, 42 F.3d at 722-23 (quoting Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st
Cir. 1993)). For general reservations as to whether Hazelwood should be ex-
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and sophistication, there may be special difficulty in separating a
teacher's classroom speech, of any sort, from speech that is taken to be
somehow approved by the school. 142 For students beyond a certain
such level, the idea that different professors may have conflicting
views, and that the university may not or cannot endorse all such
views on the merits, is more manageable.143 The ideas of a dis-
claimer, or of disassociation with the views of another, by either
teacher or administration, may be difficult at one level of age and so-
phistication, yet manageable at another.144
The Hazelwood test, itself a sort of minimum scrutiny test for ar-
guably school-approved speech in nonpublic fora, is thus insufficiently
protective of university professor speech. Hazelwood is sometimes,
but hardly always, interpreted as also implicitly requiring that the
restriction on speech be viewpoint neutral rather than viewpoint
based. 14 5 That is, the restriction on a professor's speech even under
Hazelwood generally could not be based on disapproval of the profes-
sor's message or viewpoint. 14 6
However, even if we assume strict scrutiny14 7 for viewpoint-based
restrictions of professorial speech in Hazelwood-type circumstances,
the Hazelwood test remains insufficiently protective of academic free-
tended to cover public university professor speech, see, for example, Vanderhurst
v. Colorado Mountain College District, 208 F.3d 908, 915 & 915 n.2 (10th Cir.
2000) (applying Hazelwood in case ofjunior college professor's speech, but adding
that "we need not decide definitively . . . whether that framework does in fact
govern a public college or university's control over the classroom speech of a pro-
fessor or other instructor").
142. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. For an instance of student speech in a context
such that school sponsorship would simply be an unreasonable inference, see
Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2006).
143. For a sense of the debate over the applicability of Hazelwood at a college or uni-
versity level, see Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Easter-
brook, J.); Student Government Ass'n v. Board of Trustees, 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6
(1st Cir. 1989) (declining to apply the Hazelwood test in the case of a college-level
newspaper); and Richard M. Goehler, Hosty Is a "Recipe for Confusion and Con-
flict," Comm. L., Summer 2005, at 21.
144. For discussion, see Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, Demoted to High School: Are Col-
lege Students'Free Speech Rights the Same as Those of High School Students?, 45
B.C. L. REV. 173 (2003); and Laura K. Schultz, Note, A "Disacknowledgement" of
Post-Secondary Student Free Speech-Brown v. Li and the Applicability of Hazel-
wood v. Kuhlmeier to the Post-Secondary Setting, 47 ST. L. U. L.J. 1185 (2003)
(discussing Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002), a case concerning a free
speech claim brought by a graduate student who had submitted a thesis with an
arguably nonconforming "disacknowledgements" section)).
145. For a lineup of the split among the federal circuits on this issue, see Chiras v.
Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 615 n.27 (5th Cir. 2005).
146. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (discrimination against
speech based on viewpoint as "an egregious form of content discrimination").
147. See, e.g., Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 633 n.11 (2d Cir.
2005).
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dom. Viewpoint-neutral restrictions can be imposed, for example, in
the form of entirely prohibiting the discussion of a controversial sub-
ject, from all points of view.148 This viewpoint-neutral restriction on
professorial speech could, however, still amount to a burden on aca-
demic freedom not justifiable under an appropriate free speech test.
For these reasons, the major variations on the Hazelwood test ei-
ther fit poorly with most academic freedom circumstances, or are
likely to insufficiently protect academic freedom, given the purposes
and mission of the universities and other relevant considerations and
interests.
The main alternative to Hazelwood in deciding academic freedom
cases has been one version or another of the Pickering-
Connick-Garcetti line of cases. 149 Of these cases, Garcetti150 is the
most recent, and clarifies some issues, while leaving some issues un-
resolved and creating still others.
The plaintiff in Garcetti was Richard Ceballos, a deputy district
attorney who claimed his supervisors retaliated against him because
of his speech in recommending a particular disposition of a pending
case. 151 These circumstances already illustrate that the PCG line of
cases is really a broadly sweeping test for addressing free speech
claims brought by public employees generally against their public em-
ployer. Most PCG cases will have little to do with academic freedom,
as opposed to the free speech rights of government workers in all sorts
of workplaces and tasks. The PCG test has not developed with any
special sensitivity to university environments. 15 2
As articulated in Garcetti, the government worker must first show
that he or she spoke not as a government employee discharging his or
her job responsibilities, but instead as a citizen.1 53 Further, the
speech uttered in one's capacity as a citizen rather than as an em-
148. For general discussion of these ultimately murky distinctions, see, for example,
Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55, 59-62
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech
Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978). For a survey of the general murkiness and manipulability
of these and related distinctions, see R. George Wright, Content-Based and Con-
tent-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60
U. MIAMI L. REV. 333 (2006).
149. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
150. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
151. See id. at 1956.
152. In favor of the PCG test, however, is that if the plaintiff can actually reach the
second phase or interest-balancing step, see id. at 1957, there is no reason why
the PCG test should at that point be insensitive to academic interests raised by
either an individual academic or the university administration.
153. See id. at 1958.
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ployee must also substantively amount to speech "on a matter of pub-
lic concern."15 4
These two apparently separable considerations must both be met if
the speaker's case is to remain viable. If both considerations are
deemed met, the speech at issue may or may not be protected depend-
ing on the outcome of a distinct interest-balancing stage. The Court
has described this further stage 155 as
a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer,
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees. 156
Thus, when "employees are speaking as citizens about matters of pub-
lic concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are nec-
essary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively." 157
But, on the other hand, "when public employees.., are not speaking
as citizens for First Amendment purposes, the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline."158
The majority opinion by Justice Kennedy in Garcetti, in response
to concerns raised by Justice Souter in dissent,15 9 explicitly reserved
for another day whether or not the PCG test, without further modifi-
cation, could properly be applied in cases raising issues of academic
freedom.160 Neither Justice Kennedy nor Justice Souter substan-
tively explored the question of the propriety of applying PCG in aca-
demic freedom cases. 16 1
As it stands, the PCG test is poorly adapted to the context of uni-
versity academic freedom issues with First Amendment implications.
Consider first the often decisive question of the capacity-as an em-
ployee, or else, supposedly mutually exclusively, as a citizen-in
which the professor or university official speaks. The Court recog-
nizes that the line between employee speech in discharge of one's job
responsibilities and one's speech as a citizen may on occasion be diffi-
cult to draw. 16 2
But the main problem for the PCG test in the academic freedom
area is not in drawing this line. It is instead that much of what aca-
demic freedom exists to protect amounts to speech by university em-
ployees, as employees, discharging job responsibilities as employees.
154. Id. (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
155. See id. at 1957.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1958 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).
158. Id. at 1960.
159. See id. at 1963, 1969-70 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens & Ginsburg,
JJ.).
160. See id. at 1962 (majority opinion).
161. See the brief portions of the respective opinions referred to supra notes 159-60.
162. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961-62.
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University professors are expected, as a matter of their standard em-
ployment responsibilities, to engage in a number of activities plainly
implicating academic freedom. Professors may gain credibility in
speaking by engaging in job-fulfilling activities. These activities
would include classroom lecturing and discussion, presenting papers
and serving on academic panels, providing continuing education for
graduates, communicating on behalf of professional organizations,
publishing books and journal articles, and in some circles, contribut-
ing editorials or op-ed columns to newspapers, making radio and tele-
vision appearances, and undertaking various forms of individual and
collective blogging.16 3
Even the latter of these activities might well be thought to be un-
dertaken in the exercise of professional job responsibilities, 164 yet
each would be thought of as well as a natural home for the value of
academic freedom. One could argue that some portion of the above
sorts of speech activities is also engaged in as a citizen. But PCG by
its own formulation does not allow for the possibility of speaking in a
joint employee-citizen status. 16 5
The Court might try to radically bypass this basic problem in aca-
demic freedom cases by focusing instead on whether or not the speech
was a matter of public concern. Other issues, however, would even
then arise. There are many and varied academic fields and speciali-
ties. Many academic specialities do not seek the public eye, but
clearly still do directly implicate university missions and thus require
academic freedom. In a number of academic contexts, there may be
cutting edge academic controversies on the frontiers of knowledge that
simply do not capture or even seek to capture any broader public no-
tice or concern. Much of the speech we would wish to protect under
the rubric of academic freedom thus does not fit neatly into either cat-
egory of speech merely airing some personal employment grievance, or
the more protectable category of speech that is genuinely on a subject
of public concern.
163. On the latter in particular, see, for example, Leigh Jones, Blogging Law Profs
Assault Ivory Tower: Is it Scholarship or Cyber Chit-Chat?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27,
2006, at 1. For greater detail, also see the contributions associated with Berk-
man Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, The Bloggership: How
Blogs Are Transforming Legal Scholarship, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/
bloggership.
164. Op-ed columns and blog contributions might be thought in at least some in-
stances to fall within the traditional division of scholarship and publication,
teaching, and recognizable service. For discussion of these criteria, see, for exam-
ple, Georgetown University, Guidelines for Submission of Applications, http://
president.georgetown.edu/ranktenure/submissionguidelines.html (last visited
July 1, 2006); and University of Oregon, A Faculty Guide to Promotion and Ten-
ure, http://academicaffairs.uoregon.edu/tenureguide (last visited July 1, 2006).
165. See, e.g., Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
2007]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Even this much cannot be certain, since the courts have provided
only limited, generalized guidance as to how to distinguish personal
interest from MOPIC or public concern speech.166 But especially if
"public concern" has any subjective or popular element, some courts
may have little inclination to hold as being matters of public concern
those academic disputes about which the public simply does not care
and could not grasp at a technical level even if did care. Academic
disputes on (in this sense) obscure matters, in a realm of protected
academic freedom, may directly advance the university missions of
knowledge enhancement and even civilizational advancement without
ever calling for or requiring public attention.16 7
It is certainly possible to argue that academic debate over matters
such as global warming, epidemiology, tax policy, the law of war, and
computer encryption either are or ought to be matters of genuine pub-
lic concern. We must recognize, however, that many serious scholarly
disputes in many other fields, despite their contribution to our under-
standing of the world and to cultural progress, will never be and need
not be reflected in any popular communications medium. They in-
volve speech on matters of public concern only in a sense to which the
courts, at a minimum, do not consistently adhere.168 Yet, speech on
such matters, on some frontier of scholarly knowledge, requires and
deserves academic freedom. In any area, professional jealousies, ri-
valries, vested interests, empire-building, careerism, and infighting
166. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting the unhelpful circularity involved); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
147-48 (1983) (look to statement's "content, form, and context"); Kirkland v.
Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 798 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The definition of
Imatters of public concern' is imprecise."); see generally Stephen Allred, From
Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Con-
cern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988); R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Inter-
est and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27 (1987). For the distinction as drawn by
then-Chief Judge Posner, see Dishnow v. School District, 77 F.3d 194, 197 (7th
Cir. 1996). This MOPIC versus non-MOPIC distinction has no parallel, and is
generally dispensed with, in protecting and regulating student speech. See
Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 964, 974 (9th Cir. 2006).
167. See, e.g., David Madsen, The American University in a Changing Society: Three
Views, 91 AM. J. EDUC. 356, 357 (1983) (referring to "[t]he university's invisible
product, knowledge" (quoting CLARK KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY, at viii
(3d ed. 1982))). In a sort of middle ground at present is string theory, for exam-
ple, where there are reasonably widely read popularizations of the subject that
cannot possibly place non-mathematicians in a position to independently judge
the merits of the arguments among academic specialists. For one such well-re-
garded treatment, see BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS,
HIDDEN DIMENSIONS, AND THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY (2000).
168. Consider, for example, Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education, 136 F.3d
364, 368 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), in which the en banc majority found that the
1991 selection of a high school play with themes of divorce, sexual orientation,
and nonmarital children, though publicly controversial, did not amount to speech
on a matter of public concern as opposed to a mere employee grievance.
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may at any time threaten to exact a significant price for such
speech.169
While it is again encouraging that the Garcetti majority held open
the possibility of somehow modifying the test in an academic freedom
context,170 the above basic problems remain. Too much of the logic of
PCG, whether defensible in other contexts or not, is appropriate only
barely if at all in many academic freedom contexts.
Consider, for example, the implications of Garcetti's view of public
employees speaking in the course of carrying out their job responsibili-
ties as agents of their state employer, as opposed to speaking as au-
tonomous, independent actors. The Court disturbingly maintains that
[riestricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have en-
joyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control
over what the employer itself has commissioned or created. 1 7 1
On this view, speech in carrying out one's professional responsibilities
is thus ultimately what we might call merely agentic speech, commis-
sioned or created by,17 2 paid for, 173 and thus fairly subject to control
by the state.
There are doubtless spheres of life in which paying the piper fairly
entitles one to call the tune. 174 But for any government, however
169. For a sense of the disappointment in some quarters over the perceived inability of
string theory to generate testable hypotheses or to uniquely solve problems, de-
spite its departmental high profile, see Posting of John Horgan to The Scientific
Curmudgeon, http://www.stevens.edu/csw/cgi-bin/blogs/scientific-curmudgeon/?p
=26 (June 29, 2006, 14:44 EST). See also Long Bets, http://www.longbets.org/12
(documenting Horgan's wager with Michio Kaku on whether anyone will win a
Nobel Physics Prize for the study of string (or another unified) theory by 2020,
currently eliciting roughly equally divided support among voters at the site). And
of course, any area of academic inquiry can provoke career-affecting professional
rivalries, even if the debates are not popularized or even dimly reflected in any
public concern. For further critical discussion of the MOPIC distinction in an
academic context, see Ailsa W. Chang, Resuscitating the Constitutional "Theory"
of Academic Freedom: A Search for a Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick,
53 STAN. L. REV. 915, 940-41 (2001).
170. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1962. But cf. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 428 F.3d
223, 233, 233-38 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring) (citing the court of ap-
peal's opinion in Garcetti and concluding, in this high-school level teacher case,
that "[t]he Supreme Court has never held that the First Amendment applies to a
teacher's classroom speech, and there is good reason to think that it would not do
so") (largely anticipating the logic of the Supreme Court's opinion in Garcetti,
including a conception of high-school classroom teaching as agency).
171. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
172. Id.
173. See id. (citing Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (government enti-
tled to promote its own speech message where it funds the activity in question)).
174. For some of the practical complications in the area of medical testing, see Nick
Freemantle & Deborah Stocken, Editorial, The Commercialization of Clinical Re-
search: Who Pays the Piper, Calls the Tune?, 21 FAM. PRAc. 335 (2004), available
at http://fampra.oxfordjournals.orgtcgi/content/full/21/4/335.
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democratically constituted,' 7 5 to think of the speech of all public uni-
versity faculty as its own proprietary speech, paid for and thus rightly
subject to state specification and potential dictation according to its
preferences and contractual arrangements, is plainly and deeply in-
compatible with the logic of academic freedom.17 6 This is not to sug-
gest that the combination of a strong-willed but less expert official
patron, in this case the state, and an equally strong-willed creative
expert can never be productive. 177 But universities are built upon,
and valuable because of, a combination of unique talents, diverse ac-
cumulated expertise, unshared training and insight, specialization
and division of labor, an absence of distraction, free interaction and
collaboration, rigor in recruitment and promotion, the gradual devel-
opment of maturity of professional judgment, the practical liberation
that only a sense of genuine security can widely purchase, and an un-
derlying community ethos encouraging the pursuit of truth without
fear or favor.178
Ultimately, the Garcetti model of university faculty as proxies, in-
struments, or agents expressing views approved of, if not specified by,
the state paying for their performance undermines the mission and
purposes of the worthy state university. Adding broadly to the trea-
sury of scholarly knowledge simply cannot be reduced to carrying out
anyone's wishes or preferences, 17 9 whether of any sitting government
175. Or certainly any wealthy private corporation, industry, foundation, or individual.
176. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (stating that First
Amendment academic freedom "does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of ortho-
doxy over the classroom").
177. See, e.g., IRVING STONE, THE AGONY AND THE ECSTASY (1961) (reconstructing the
relationship between Michelangelo and Pope Julius II with regard to the Sistine
Chapel ceiling project).
178. See supra notes 51-79 and accompanying text. Some of these elements are con-
joined in John R. Searle, Two Concepts of Academic Freedom, in THE CONCEPT OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 86, 89 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 1975). More abstractly, con-
sider Benard Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, in 3 Coi-
LECTED WORKS OF BERNARD LONERGAN 619 (Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M.
Doran eds.) (Univ. of Toronto 2000) (1957) (noting "the detached, disinterested,
unrestricted desire to know" that "heads beyond one's own joy in one's own in-
sight to the further question whether one's insight is correct ... independent of
the individual's likes and dislikes, of his wishful and his anxious thinking"). For
possible implications for academic freedom of treating even advanced university
education as essentially a consumer product exchanged in a commercial transac-
tion, see Cheryl A. Cameron et al., Academic Bills of Rights: Conflict in the Class-
room, 31 J.C. & U.L. 243 (2005).
179. See Lonergan, supra note 178, at 619; Cameron et al., supra note 178. This of
course is not to suggest that individual scholars should be entrusted to decide
broader questions of what the university should emphasize in its offerings, what
budgets will permit, what generally should and should not be subsidized, what
schools should be opened, etc.
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or of trustees or of university faculty themselves.180 As John Stuart
Mill classically recognized, truth is best pursued through indepen-
dent-mindedness, individualism, decentralization, diligent study, and
diversity of voices.lsl The location of truth in any given instance is
best gauged, however fallibly, by transactions in an admittedly imper-
fect marketplace of ideas,' 8 2 rather than as determined by any con-
centrated governmental or corporate entity.' 8 3
Other sorts of variations of the Hazelwood or the PCG tests have
occasionally been applied in contexts of professorial speech.18 4 Others
180. See id. For anticipation, including in university settings, of Garcetti's agentic or
state employer "proxy" theme, see, for example, Brown v. Armenti, 247 F.3d 69,
75 (3d Cir. 2001) (classroom speech as speech in which the professor serves as the
university's proxy in carrying out the mission and the academic freedom of the
university administration as an institution). See also Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. Bd.
of Educ., 271 F.3d 1141, 1149 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing classroom speech
as ultimately government speech and on that basis regulatable by the govern-
ment); Lee v. York County Sch. Div., 418 F. Supp. 2d 816 (E.D. Va. 2006) (same
discussion at the high school level). For brief critique of this agentic or proxy
theory in a high school setting antedating Garcetti, see Cockrel v. Shelby County
School District, 270 F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (6th Cir. 2001), and outside of any school
context, Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 599 (6th Cir. 2003) (also preceding
Garcetti). See also Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Proposed Statement on Academic
Freedom, in THE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 178, at 263, 264 ("It
is both irrational and unjust to employ a person to do a thing and then to prevent
him from doing it."). Of course, some universities or governments might be quite
upfront and forthcoming about limits on academic freedom, but this hardly en-
sures that the knowledge discovery and transmission aims of universities are
thereby being well executed.
181. See MILL, supra note 99, at 76-77; see also DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 250 (inde-
pendent ethical value of individual responsibility).
182. See, classically, Justice Holmes' assertion that "the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market," Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). It is certainly
possible to critique the model of the marketplace of ideas in various ways. See,
e.g., Stanley Ingber, The Markeplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DuKE
L.J. 1. But the upshot of such critiques is rarely thought to be that additional
powers to determine what should be held to be academically true should be
lodged in existing governments.
183. Some aspects of alleged misconduct by government agencies can be addressed
through whistleblower protection statutes, but such statutes can cover only a rel-
atively small portion of academic freedom issues. See Zack, supra note 89, at
916-17; see generally Elletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99 (2000); William M. Howard, Com-
mon-Law Retaliatory Discharge of Employee for Disclosing Unlawful Acts or
Other Misconduct of Employer or Fellow Employees, 105 A.L.R. 5th 351 (2003).
184. See, e.g., Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) (university professor
restricted in interjecting religiously based personal beliefs or "biases" into classes
in several formats), cited in, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir.
2005) (en banc). Bishop seems to involve something of an ad hoc balancing of
various test elements and other considerations, including references to Hazel-
wood, see Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1072 n.5 (limiting teacher autonomy in the class-
room pursuant to Hazelwood); Pickering, see id. at 1072 (broad Pickering
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are devisable. None to date, however, provides any indication of how
to satisfactorily resolve any of the most basic problems associated with
Hazelwood or the PCG cases in the context of constitutional academic
freedom.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have seen that none of the tests widely employed in teacher
free speech cases is even modestly well adapted to address academic
free speech issues in university contexts. The current tests tend in
crucial respects to underprotect academic freedom from the stand-
point of the long-term public good.
Is there some obvious alternative to these generally inadequate
tests? One alternative, familiar from other free speech contexts,
would be to apply a strict scrutiny test 8 5 in the case of any significant
potential regulatory threat to academic freedom. None of the tests ex-
amined above is as generally protective of academic freedom against
government interference as strict scrutiny would be. Under a rule of
strict scrutiny, such restrictions on academic freedom at public uni-
versities would require the government to show that the restriction in
question was genuinely narrowly tailored to promote a compelling or
overridingly vital government interest.' 8 6
balancing taken "as our starting point"); Hazelwood again, see id. at 1074 (the
'somewhat amorphous" balancing in Bishop "takes as its polestar [Hazelwood's]
concern for the 'basic educational mission' of the school," but only as that mission
is conceived by the school administration, along with considerations of "context");
the perhaps unintended coercive effects of the professor's speech, see id.; the
value of academic freedom, see id. at 1075 (but as limited in choice of curriculum);
the limited scope of the university restrictions on the professor's speech, see id. at
1076; and the distinction between Professor Bishop as a "course instructor" and
as an "independent educator or researcher," id. at 1076-77, with the circuit court
ultimately upholding the limited restrictions imposed on Professor Bishop's
speech, id.
185. For standard discussions of strict scrutiny in a variety of free speech contexts, see
Republican Party v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002) (judicial campaign
speech); United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims
Board, 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (withholding crime-related book profits); Sable
Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (telephone access to sexual
speech); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee, 489 U.S.
214, 222 (1989); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (protests in the vicinity of
foreign embassies); and Perry Education. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (insurgent teacher's union access to public school mail-
boxes). Note that while Perry helpfully suggests that speech restrictions in even
nonpublic fora cannot be based on viewpoint, id. at 45-46, this principle was
blurred by Hazelwood's omission of such a requirement, and there is also the
deeper problem of defining the purpose or scope of the nonpublic forum in the
first place.
186. See cases cited supra note 185. The question of narrow tailoring considers not
only any possible unnecessary breadth of the speech restriction, but also whether
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This a stringent test, but it is widely applied in free speech con-
texts and certainly in some free speech contexts of lesser moment. 8 7
We live in an information-driven era,' 8 8 with revolutions in computer
technology, genetics, nanotechnology, and pharmacology in the offing.
If this is so, it is difficult to deny the increasingly vital importance of
the efficient promotion of the university's knowledge-related mis-
sions.18 9 But the broader point is the importance of the unimpaired
scholarly operation of the entirety of the university, across all aca-
demic departments, in all eras. All academic departments and their
membership have their role to play in preserving, enhancing, and
transmitting the best that has been thought and said. 190
We need not argue, in fact, that promoting academic freedom and
thereby the efficient furtherance of the university mission is always,
or indeed ever, a compelling public interest.19 1 All we need show is
that significant potential regulatory threats to academic freedom
should themselves promote, in an appropriately narrowly tailored
way, some compelling public interest. And given the importance of
the broad university missions and the need for academic freedom if
they are to be effectively furthered, it is difficult to see strict scrutiny
as anything but appropriate.
There will be, of course, many instances of government regulation
that impinge upon academic freedom, but in only some nonthreaten-
ing way. A professor might be denied, for example, the right to teach a
class at a specified time, or access to an office at some specified time,
merely for ordinary building maintenance purposes. In such cases,
strict scrutiny would be an unnecessarily stringent judicial test. Some
such cases are classified under the rubric of content-neutral time,
place, or manner restrictions on speech.192 In those cases, the free
the speech regulation is unduly severe, in some way disproportionate to the grav-
ity or effect of the offending speech. Id.
187. See, e.g., Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 117, 126 (protecting commercial use
of sexually explicit prerecorded phone messages "popularly known as 'dial-a-
porn'").
188. See, e.g., ERIK P. BucY, LIVING IN THE INFORMATION AGE: A NEW MEDIA READER
(2d ed. 2005).
189. See supra notes 51-68 and accompanying text. This is not to suggest that all
significant basic advances in either these or other fields, now or at any point in
history, are owed directly to the work of the universities, as distinct from all other
cultural and economic institutions.
190. Cf MATTHEW ARNOLD, CULTURE AND ANARCHY 6-7 (J. Dover Wilson ed., 1932).
191. See, e.g., Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 126 (describing the need for a "legit-
imate interest").
192. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). There are also
a range of complex and difficult situations in which the individual professor
speaks on a matter neither of merely personal interest nor within the professor's
specialized expertise, as on a matter of significant university governance, and in
a venue that neither reaches the broader public nor counts as scholarship, teach-
ing, or service. It may be that in such cases, the principle that both faculty and
20071
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speech test is reduced a bit, requiring only reasonably narrow tailor-
ing to a significant or substantial government interest, along with the
availability of ample alternative channels for communicating.19 3
The more central concern, however, given the current Hazelwood
and PCG tests, must be whether strict scrutiny is too rigorous and
demanding. Here, we can only say that strict scrutiny would not ab-
solutize academic freedom. Here, as elsewhere, strict scrutiny should
not mean strict in theory and fatal in fact.194 Academic freedom is
extremely important, but it admittedly carries opportunity costs and
tradeoffs of varying severity.
Academic freedom exists against a background of institutional and
community expectations of continuing academic achievement and
minimum standards of behavior.19 5 There may be, to begin with, a
wide range of conflicts between the academic freedom of individuals or
groups and the academic freedom of the university itself in the sense
of institutional autonomy.19 6 What amounts to the free speech inter-
ests of one person or group may also conflict with the free speech in-
terests of another person or group.197 Free speech rights, including
academic freedom claims, may in addition conflict with constitu-
tional98 and nonconstitutional'99 rights of other persons. Academic
administration should be able to freely communicate their responsible and well-
considered sentiments should be respected largely as a matter of sensible organi-
zational management principles.
193. See id. Actually, the familiar distinction between content-based and content-neu-
tral restrictions on speech is remarkably murky and does not invariably track the
seriousness of any potential threat to free speech values. See Wright, supra note
148, at 333-37, 364-65.
194. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
195. For discussion, see authorities cited supra note 60; Anne Colby & Thomas Ehr-
lich, From Ideology to Inquiry, INSIDE HIGHER ED., June 2, 2006, http://www.
insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/views/2006/06/02/ehrlich. For further dis-
cussion, see Pugel v. Board of Trustees, 378 F.3d 659, 668 (7th Cir. 2004); and
Stanley Fish, Editorial, Conspiracy Theories 101, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2006, at
13.
196. See supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text. In a sense, any university at-
tempt to discipline an individual professor for speaking is itself a form of"speech"
on the part of the university as an institution. But even where the university is
prevented from restricting the professor's speech, the university will still be free
to literally say anything it wishes to say, including maintaining silence, on the
subject of the individual professor's speech.
197. For extended broad discussion, see R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are
As Hard (and As Easy) As They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335 (2001).
198. For an attempt to use some standard basic understandings of the idea of human
dignity to guide the adjudication of some of these tradeoffs, see Wright, supra
note 55.
199. By extension, see Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486,
1534-36 (M.D. Fla. 1991), a case rejecting a free-speech defense against a Title
VII claim of sexual harassment via speech. See also EEOC v. Preferred Mgmt.
Corp., 216 F. Supp. 2d 763 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (alleged workplace religious discrimi-
nation under Title VII).
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freedom might, in a rare case, also come into genuine conflict with a
compelling public interest not entirely reducible to claims of individ-
ual right.200
In light of all these basic conflicts, there is every potential for some
direct and meaningful restrictions on academic freedom to pass a
strict scrutiny test, if the restriction in question is sufficiently well
crafted. Strict scrutiny thus, in our context, amounts to a sensible
middle ground between idolizing academic freedom and the current
failure on the established judicial fronts to fully recognize the public
importance of academic freedom.
200. Imagine a variation on the facts of United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), a case involving a temporary restraining order, granted
despite the strong constitutional bias against what amounts to licensing of publi-
cations and prior restraint, in the case of a claim of a national security interest
against publishing an article entitled The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why
We're Telling It. Consider similar states of facts, set on public university cam-
puses, involving other perhaps dangerous technologies, or discussing encryption
technologies in some assertedly dangerous way. For a case preliminarily discuss-
ing export controls over expressive or speech-embodying encryption technologies,
see Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000).
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